The infamous, or perhaps famous, “Six Pack” came into existence in the early 1990s. Six women of the Minneapolis Police Department gathered over drinks, and a lifetime friendship was born.
Karen Runyon was part of the group. She was the forensic document examiner for the department, and she also ran her own consulting firm.
Karen was known across the nation for her knowledge, skill and expert testimony in hundreds of cases. She won many national awards for her work as well.
But to “Six Pack”, she was simply a friend, part of a special gathering of women.
When she developed breast cancer, she fought against it like she fought against injustice and unfairness everywhere. In late March of 2012, she lost that battle.
But she is, and will always be, a part of “Six Pack.”
Pictured from L to R: Cari Gerlicher; Michele Smolley; Penny Parrish; “Pepper the Dog”; Karen Runyon; Shirleen Hoffman; and Connie Leaf. Photograph courtesy of “Six Pack”.
On August 13, 1929, around 4:00 pm, 12-year-old Dorothy Aune was sent by her mother on an errand to the corner store at 24th Avenue South and 38th Street.
Dorothy never arrived at the store.
Her strangled and bound body was discovered at 6:30 the following morning near the railroad tracks at Hiawatha Avenue between 26th and 27th Streets by two iceman out on their rounds.
A special “homicide squad” was formed by Chief Harry C. Lindholm to investigate Dorothy’s murder. On August 23, 1929 he announced to the Minneapolis Star that the homicide unit would become a permanent department of the MPD.
Dorothy Aune’s murder was never solved. Numerous false leads were followed, persons of interest were questioned, suspects were arrested and even several confessions were made but all turned out to be false.
Photograph from the Minneapolis Star of August 16, 1929
On January 10, 1944, the Minneapolis Police Department launched the largest, most comprehensive police training course the city had seen. 120 Minneapolis Police Officers were enrolled in the training course which took place on the second floor of the Bryant Avenue Station.
Chief Joseph Jonas thought that the training course was especially necessary and valuable at that particular time because more than 100 experienced Minneapolis Police Officers had entered the armed forces. Their replacements had relatively less experience in matters such as rules of evidence, proper methods of investigation and preparation of cases, amongst other subjects.
The curriculum included courses on criminal law, evidence, accident investigations, use of photography, scientific aids, court work, and traffic laws.
The students were drawn equally from the general force and from the traffic department.
Traffic Captain Oscar Bakken was enthusiastic about the training course because it would teach the most modern methods of traffic control. Thinking ahead to peacetime, Captain Bakken believed that the course would prepare his department to better cope with post-war driving conditions. “Adjustment to peacetime driving habits of both soldiers and civilians is likely to create a problem,” he said.
The instructors came from Northwestern University, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Automobile Safety Club Council, and the City Attorney’s Office. Municipal Judges and Police Identification Experts also taught classes.
The training course ran for nine weeks with three classes of 40 officers each receiving three weeks of instruction. The last week of each class was spent doing field work.
The entire cost of the training course was $1000.
Source: Minneapolis Tribune from December 19, 1943
Pictured in photograph from L to R: Minneapolis Police Sergeant Clair Tripp and Instructor H.R. Hamm teach a traffic control scenario as Officers Wayne Nissen and Carl Johnson participate in the Minneapolis Police Officer Training course at the Bryant Avenue Station. Photograph courtesy of Hennepin County Library
Although there had been smaller drills previously, Minneapolis executed its first city-wide blackout drill on the night of September 11, 1942.
The blackout drill covered all 5,600 blocks of the city.
8,000 Air Raid Wardens, 500 Minneapolis Police Officers, 500 Auxiliary Police Officers, 500 Firefighters, 750 Auxiliary Firefighters, 400 Rescue Squad Workers, 500 Relief, Evacuation, and Medical Workers as well as the Red Cross and the Boy Scouts took part in the blackout drill.
Newspaper reporters cruised around the city with Minneapolis Police Detectives William H. Fabriz and Glen W. McLean (later Chief of Police from 1946-48).
Detective William H. Fabriz in 1938
One half hour before the blackout drill began, Hennepin Avenue was lined with people waiting to watch. Entire families gathered on porches and in doorways on Grant Street as if awaiting a parade.
Once the blackout began, the streets were so dark that reporters commented that they could as well be in the middle of the ocean or Wyoming.
A few violations were noted by Detective McClean: a lit office building on 2nd Street South; a building on 5th and Nicollet Avenue with lights burning on the 4th Floor; and a large lighted-sign on 4th Street and Marquette Avenue were recorded.
Chief Glen W. McLean in 1946
During the blackout drill, the inside of Police Headquarters was lit by candles and a reporter described it as having a Christmasy appearance.
Wardens were “stumped” by a glow coming from a dead tree at the home of E.O. Swanson at 4157 – 45th Avenue South. The glow was visible from 100 feet away and after some investigation it was found to be from phosphorus emanating from the wood of the tree.
After the “All-Clear” sounded, the Red Cross served donuts and coffee to all of the “casualties” in front of the State Theater. At the same time, across town near Humboldt Avenue South and 24th Street, Air Raid Wardens Joseph Broude and H.E. Beatty found a blue satin nightgown sitting on a curb without its owner.
Source: Minneapolis Star for Friday, September 11, 1942.
Photograph of the large switch, located at an undisclosed location in Minneapolis, used to shut down streetlights courtesy of Hennepin County Library
Photograph of Detective William H. Fabriz from April 5, 1938 courtesy of Hennepin County Library
Photograph of Chief Glen W. McLean from 1946 courtesy of Minneapolis Star
Shortly after 6:00 pm on August 1, 2007, the Interstate 35W bridge over the Mississippi River near downtown Minneapolis was loaded with rush hour traffic creeping through an ongoing construction project. Without warning, the bridge collapsed, taking with it 111 vehicles. Thirteen people died and 145 were injured in the collapse of the bridge.
State and local units from fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management and public works immediately received alerts. Emergency responders were faced with a number of tasks: (1) rescue people from the vehicles and the water; (2) extinguish car fires; and (3) treat and transport the injured.
The successful rescue and recovery efforts were largely the result of prior planning by a team that had anticipated a major disaster, funded improvements in critical infrastructure and increases in emergency personnel, and trained as a team by working across organizational boundaries.
The disaster presented some unique jurisdictional issues. The Federal government owned the bridge, but the bridge was operated by the State of Minnesota. After the collapse, the bridge lodged into the Mississippi River and along the river’s banks. The river was under the jurisdiction of the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Water Patrol, but the banks of the river were under the jurisdiction of the Minneapolis Police Department. In addition, multi-agency resources from adjoining counties and cities, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Navy all assisted in the rescue efforts.
FEMA lauded the overall performance of the rescue efforts and noted that the combination of foresight, investment and teamwork prepared the emergency responders for the disaster. In its report, FEMA noted, ”Strong working relationships and knowledge of roles and procedures were arguably the greatest strengths of the Minneapolis emergency services community’s response. The city had invested heavily in the development of those relationships, which were built through plan development, universal NIMS training, appropriate use of exercises and strategic planning over several years”.
“These factors contributed heavily to creating an environment in which key players not only knew each other, but were familiar with the operations and disaster assignments of others. When it came time to pull together efficiently as a team – they did.”
The timeline of events as captured by the FCC below demonstrates that emergency resources were mobilized quickly and effectively during the disaster:
6:02 PM – Bridge collapses without warning.
6:05 PM – EMS units dispatched for possible bridge collapse.
6:06 PM – Minneapolis Fire Department (MFD) dispatched to the bridge for a reported bridge collapse. Dispatch received data from bridge cameras confirming extent of damage. Dispatched units notified of reports of injuries, extensive structural damage, and cars in water.
6:11 PM – First dispatched units arrive on scene. Emergency responders establish command post and assess situation.
6:16 PM – Second alarm status requested and five additional MFD units dispatched.
6:18 PM – Additional MFD units arrive on scene. Responding fire units brief command of status of situation.
6:24 PM – Emergency Operations Center (EOC) opened and staffed 24 hours a day for next four days. On August 5th it began operating 12 hours a day until August 20th when the last body was recovered.
6:25 PM – MFD Assistant Chief of Operations assumes command and sets up command post. Minneapolis Police Department establishes their command post. Operating under the Incident Command System, rescue operations are expanded.
6:26 PM – Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Supervisor arrives on scene and assumes command of water rescue activities. 12 agencies with 28 watercraft arrive within the first hour. Two 25 foot boats will be dispatched by the Coast Guard and arrive within 5 hours.
6:50 PM – Responding units provide a status of activities. Preliminary search of bridge is now complete, rescue activities proceeding in water, units report a collapse of bridge with some victims entrapped within collapsed structure, they report fires are being contained, and that an engineer is on the bridge to assess its stability.
7:00 PM – Engineers report that bridge stability is questionable.
7:27 PM – It is determined that all individuals on the bridge and next to the water have been rescued. Rescue phase of operation is now complete. Recovery operations will officially begin at dawn on 8/2, the following day.
7:55 PM – Last live rescue victim transported from scene.
8:11 PM – 50 patients have now been transported to various hospitals by EMS. 61 units including 31 ambulances have responded. 110 people will require treatment at hospitals or emergency clinics. 13 deaths will be reported.
Until midnight on August 2nd, the 911 call center received approximately 300 calls per hour. Recovery operations were conducted until August 20th and operations associated with the removal of debris, monitoring of hazardous material, and other activities associated with the disaster continued for even longer.
The National Transportation Safety Board ultimately determined that the probable cause of the collapse of the I-35W bridge was the inadequate load capacity, due to a design error of the gusset plates, which failed under a combination of (1) substantial increases in the weight of the bridge, which resulted from previous bridge modifications, and (2) the traffic and concentrated construction loads on the bridge on the day of the collapse.
We are thinking today of those who perished in the disaster and of their families and friends, of those who were injured, and of those who arrived on the scene to help all who needed them.
“Emergency Communications during the Minneapolis Bridge Disaster: A Technical Case Study” by the Federal Communications Commission’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau’s Communications Systems Analysis Division
“U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series I-35W Bridge Collapse and Response Minneapolis, Minnesota USFA-TR-166/August 2007” from FEMA
Photographs from “Minneapolis Police 150th Anniversary” book published by Acclaim Press (currently out of print)
Today we are thinking of Minneapolis Police Officer Melissa Jayne Schmidt who was killed in the line of duty on August 1, 2002.
Officer Schmidt was shot and killed after she and her partner responded to a call shortly after 7:00 pm reporting a woman with a gun at Horn Towers.
Upon arrival, the officers made with contact with the 60-year-old suspect. While Officer Schmidt and her partner were questioning her, the woman said that she needed to go to the bathroom.
Officer Schmidt escorted the woman to the public restroom in the lobby of Horn Towers. While in the restroom, the woman produced a handgun and opened fire, striking Officer Schmidt in the abdomen below her vest. Officer Schmidt was able to return fire and killed the suspect.
Officer Schmidt served with the Minneapolis Police Department for more than 6 years and was assigned to the Public Housing Unit. She was 35 years old at the time of her death.
Officer Schmidt had previously served in the United States Marine Corps in MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, and the U.S. Foreign Interests Section in Havana, and in Cuba as a Marine Security Guard.
Officer Schmidt was survived by her parents and her brother.
Today we remember Officer Schmidt and extend our sympathy and condolences to her family and friends and to all who miss her.
This blue enameled lapel pin is inscribed with the text “6367/ MELISSA SCHMIDT/ AUGUST 1, 2002/ WE WILL REMEMBER”. This pin was presented to Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty during a Law Enforcement Memorial Association luncheon in 2002. Photograph of pin courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society
In January of 1936, a 58-year-old Minneapolis grocery store owner named Oscar Odean was shot to death by two armed robbers in his store at 4047 Washington Avenue North.
The robbers shot Mr. Odean as they entered the store and then shot him twice more, killing him, as they left the store.
The shooting was witnessed by 8-year-old Carl G. Benson who was a neighborhood boy and a good friend to Mr. Odean. Carl spent a lot of his spare time at the grocery store visiting with Mr. Odean and other neighbors.
Only two months earlier, while Carl was visiting, the store had been robbed and Mr. Odean had been shot in the hand as he wrestled with the robber after the robber had thrown Carl to the ground.
At that time, Mr. Odean told Carl that if the store should ever be robbed again Carl should observe the details, call the police, and provide as much information as possible.
Carl remembered Mr. Odean’s instructions. As soon as the men left the store, Carl called the police and provided a description of them, what they were wearing, and also the details of their getaway car.
After days of investigation by the Minneapolis Police Detective Squad both suspects were in custody.
Carl bravely identified both suspects for the police and helped send the men who had killed his friend to prison.
Here is a photograph from February 12, 1936 of Carl G. Benson identifying one of the suspects during the Odean Murder Trial. Photograph courtesy of Hennepin County Library.
Can anyone identify the officer directing traffic in this photograph taken in Downtown Minneapolis at 7th Street and Marquette Avenue on a sunny day in May of 1970?
